Discussion between Professor David Shinn and G. E. Gorfu regarding Ethiopia-Somalia issue

Somalia could be Ethiopia's quagmire
A more involved military offensive might pose the same problems the U.S. is facing in Iraq, observers say.

A reply to your question regaring Ethiopia and Somalia
Dear Professor David Shinn,
By G. E. Gorfu

The Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict
Key Points
By David Shinn
December 27, 2006

Rebuttal to Professor Shinn’s Response
by G. E. Gorfu

Rebuttal to Professor Shinn’s Response

by G. E. Gorfu

The analysis you have written in reply to my previous letter is quite correct, and I am glad that you agreed Ethiopia has legitimate security concerns in Somalia. From the outset, let me tell you that I too, agree with your analysis in almost every point that you have made.

There is however an issue that I would like to raise in regards to point No. 10 in your letter, and I quote, “If Ethiopia completes its military campaign quickly and then withdraws all of its forces, the area it has taken from the Islamic Courts will presumably be turned over to the TFG and former warlords. Can they successfully withstand attacks from the Islamic Courts? This is highly doubtful. Will the TFG and the former warlords remain united? This, too, is questionable.”

There are three points to consider here: first, returning the areas liberated form the Islamic Courts being turned over to the TFG. These areas can also be handed over to International Forces of the UN or AU. That is where they should be deployed until such time that a Sovereign Somali Government can be constituted and installed.

Secondly, can the TFG successfully withstand attacks from the Islamic forces? In my view, these so called, “Islamic Courts” are not even a united force, as you yourself have indicated, but are some thirty independent warlords. They only recently got together through sheer pressure and intervention by foreign Islamic elements from as far away as Egypt, Pakistan, Libya, Hezbollah, Iran… etc. through a prime facilitator, Eritrea’s Issays Afeworki. Therefore, if these outside elements are removed, it is feasible to expect that the TFG can, and should prevail.

Finally, ‘Will the TFG and the former warlords remain united?’ By “united” I take it that you to mean: “united” to the cause of forming a stable Somali government. My response here is that it is for the Somali people to decide what they would like to do at that juncture. If they allow the TFG, (“Transitional” as its name implies) to carry out its duty of constituting a Somali Government, well and good. It is to be expected that all factions will cooperate towards that one goal, and each group would have a number of seats in the future assembly according to the votes they get.

That failing, however, all this should be left for the Somali people to decide when all foreign participants leave the scene. If they want to fight it out among themselves that too should be an option left for them. As long as all foreign forces leave, and do not interfere, it should be understood that this it the internal affair of Somalia.

The most important thing in all this is to secure Somalia’s borders and enforce the UN arms embargo, so that no more arms shipments ever sneak into Somalia. I repeat, unless that can be guaranteed by the International Community, it will all be a dejavu, and in a year or two, we will be right back where we are today.

The Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict
Key Points
By David Shinn
December 27, 2006

The following is my abbreviated assessment of the current fighting between Ethiopian military forces and militias of the Somali Islamic Courts. I approach the topic from the standpoint of US interests, not those of either Ethiopia or Somalia. I define US interests as achieving political and economic stability in East Africa and the Horn, minimizing or eliminating humanitarian disasters, and successfully countering terrorism.

1. Ethiopia has legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis Somalia, not the least of which is a 1,000 mile long border. There is a history of previous hostility, the legacy of Mogadishu’s Greater Somalia policy that laid claim to about one-quarter of the land area (the Haud and the Ogaden inhabited by Somali-speaking peoples) of Ethiopia, and the fact that at least one senior leader of the Islamic Courts recently stated his intention to revive irredentist claims in Ethiopia. Another senior leader of the Islamic Courts disavowed any such claim.

2. There is also the legacy of terrorist attacks against Ethiopia in the mid and late-1990s emanating from al-Ittihad al-Islami, now a defunct organization in Somalia. Several of its leaders, however, hold senior positions in the Islamic Court structure. In addition, there is credible evidence that three non-Somalis involved in the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam took refuge in Somalia and may still be there.

3. The Ethiopian military is far more powerful than the militias of the Islamic Courts, which can not at this writing pose a serious military threat to the Ethiopian homeland, including the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region. The Ethiopian military has the capacity to defeat handily the Islamic Court militias inside Somalia in conventional engagements.

4. The more than thirty Islamic Courts are neither unified nor homogeneous except that they agree on their desire to create an Islamic state governed by some form of Sharia. They also appear unified in their opposition to Ethiopia. Different Courts seem to have different interpretations of the way they would implement Sharia. Some seem to prefer a benign version while others have taken extreme positions. It is important to remember that even Muslims in Ethiopia, which is almost fifty percent Muslim, observe elements of Sharia in civil issues.

5. Prior to the intervention in Somalia of Ethiopian fighting forces, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) held Baidoa and some surrounding territory, but little else. The Islamic Courts held about fifty percent of the former Somali Republic. Puntland and Somaliland were the two largest components not under their control. The UN, African Union and even the Arab League recognized the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia.

6. Clan structure is critical to Somali political dynamics. To simplify, there are five major clans that then break down into sub-clans, sub-sub-clans, etc. Most, but certainly not all, support for the Islamic Courts comes from the Hawiye clan and especially its Habr Gedir sub-clan. Even within this sub-clan, the Ayr sub-sub-clan is most important.

7. The Islamic Courts achieved power quickly due to their ability to defeat discredited warlords in Mogadishu and establish for the first time in almost two decades relative peace and security. Most Somalis were fed up with sporadic conflict between clans and various political rivals for power. The Courts also instituted welcome social services. On the other hand, the extreme positions (e.g. declaring that anyone who did not pray fives times a day was subject to beheading) of one or more of the Courts alienated many Somalis. The effort by the Islamic Courts to ban the mild narcotic, Khat, which has been widely used by Somalis for many decades, was especially unpopular. (Khat is an illegal drug in North America and highly destructive to family life.)

8. This brings us to the most recent Ethiopian military intervention. Ethiopia stated that the intervention will be brief and not involve an effort to enter the capital of Mogadishu. Ethiopia reportedly intends to damage significantly the fighting capacity of the Islamic Court militias, forcing them to return to the negotiating table on an equal basis with the TFG.

9. The Ethiopian strategy, from the standpoint of ETHIOPIAN interests, is appropriate. But can it work? I have serious doubts.

10. If Ethiopia completes its military campaign quickly and then withdraws all of its forces, the area it has taken from the Islamic Courts will presumably be turned over to the TFG and former warlords. Can they successfully withstand attacks from the Islamic Courts? This is highly doubtful. Will the TFG and the former warlords remain united? This, too, is questionable.

11. And if Ethiopia concludes that it must remain for an extended period of time in order to insure the success of the TFG and former warlords, how will Ethiopian forces fare? I seriously doubt that Ethiopia wants to get bogged down in a long, drawn out guerrilla campaign with Islamic Court militias deep inside Somalia and far from Ethiopian supply centers. This would not be in the interest of stability in the Horn of Africa or in the interest of the US.

12. It is important to emphasize that other foreign players are deeply involved in the fighting in Somalia. According to numerous press reports, significant numbers of jihadi fighters from the Middle East and South Asia have arrived to support the Islamic Courts. The UN-sponsored Monitoring Group on Somalia reported in October that there were 2,000 Eritrean troops in Somalia in support of the Islamic Courts. (Eritrea denies that it has troops in Somalia; the denial is not credible.)

13. From my perspective, and I believe from the standpoint of the best interests of the US, all foreign forces should leave Somalia—Ethiopian troops, Eritrean troops, and non-Somali jihadis. Little positive will be accomplished, however, if only one or two of these components depart and one or two stay.

14. It is equally important that the Islamic Courts and the TFG return to the negotiating table where they must sit down in the spirit of compromise and agree to a power sharing arrangement. This will be difficult, but it is not impossible. The talks will probably result in an Islamic state, but Somalia is virtually entirely Muslim and it would not be the first Islamic State. Islam in Somalia also has a long tradition of moderation. A government comprised of representatives of the secular TFG and religiously-focused Islamic Courts provides at least the possibility of a government that can establish security and be accepted by the majority of Somalis. As long as foreign parties play a major role in Somalia, there is virtually no possibility of long-term peace. At best there will be a short-term imposed peace and even this is probably wishful thinking.

15. Foreign forces will probably not leave Somalia unless they face considerable international pressure. This will require the friends of the TFG and Ethiopia such as the US and the European Union to put pressure on Ethiopia to leave. The Arab League collectively and its individual members must do the same with the Islamic Courts so that the foreign jihadis leave Somalia. Friends of Eritrea such as Italy must ensure that the Eritrean troops leave. Any other non-Somali groups, such as Ethiopian dissident organizations that oppose the current government in Addis Ababa, must also leave if they are present in Somalia.

16. There is obviously no guarantee that this scenario will work. It is fraught with challenges. As I look at the problem, however, it has at least as good a chance of success and will result in less loss of life than the alternatives. It will also minimize the return to Somalia of a humanitarian disaster. Finally, it is the approach that comes closest to achieving US interests in the region as it might permit the return of stability and open the door to serious discussions with Somali authorities concerning past links to terrorism.

A reply to your question regaring Ethiopia and Somalia

Dear Professor David Shinn,

G. E. Gorfu

I read your comments and concerns about the situation in the Horn of Africa, and you have been reported in the LA Times by the Times Staff Writer, Edmund Sanders, to have said: ""I don't understand what Ethiopia 's objective is..." Sir, when a Jihad is declared on any country, what other objective would it have, except to defend itself?

The concerted effort of Egypt , Libya , Hezbollah , Eritrea , Saudi Arabia , Pakistan , and Iran ... etc., all of them Islamic countries and some known terrorist groups, has always been to destabilize Ethiopia by every possible means. I would like to quote a recent report by Reuters that you might have missed: -

alertnet.org

where all these counties have been identified and listed as being behind all the foreign fighters in Somalia . So, there is no way for Ethiopia to just sit back and watch these developments as these terrorists get more and more entrenched in the area, and come across to invade and exact punishment. For the last several years, they have covertly sent terrorist into Ethiopia , where in Addis Ababa and other cities they threw bombs, killing many innocent people, destroying properties, and creating havoc.

So, Ethiopia has legitimate security concerns in Somalia . The anarchy that prevailed there for the last fifteen years, where the one Somali group has been fighting another in clannish turf wars should never be allowed to spread into Ethiopia . Ethiopian authorities have the sacred duty and responsibility of securing the nation's borders and of providing law and order in a land, which is home to close to 80 million people.

Finally, you are reported to have concluded by saying: "...international leaders should immediately intervene and push to remove all foreign fighters from Somalia ." I could not agree with you more. In fact, that should have been done a year or two ago. But by foreign fighters, I hope you do not only mean Ethiopians, as the foreign fighters there have come from all those countries listed above, and have been there for several years hatching their plans to invade Ethiopia . It is because this was not done by the “international leaders” timely that Ethiopia has had to engage in this war that it ill affords.

I hope this answer your question. And I also hope Ethiopia cleans up the mess in that area and withdraws immediately. I do not want to see my country bogged down as an occupying force. But it is important that these so called, "international leaders" can guaranty no foreign shipment of arms will ever again come into Somalia . Otherwise, we will be in a similar situation within a few months or years.

G. E. Gorfu

Somalia could be Ethiopia's quagmire
A more involved military offensive might pose the same problems the U.S. is facing in Iraq, observers say.

By Edmund Sanders, Times Staff Writer

December 26, 2006

NAIROBI, KENYA — Ethiopia's attacks against Islamic forces in Somalia may have delivered a short-term military victory, but analysts warned that a longer offensive could present the U.S. ally with some of the same challenges facing American forces in Iraq.

Airstrikes against the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and other towns Sunday and Monday demonstrated Ethiopia's military superiority over the Islamic forces that seized most of southern Somalia during the summer.

But Ethiopia would be hard-pressed to dispatch enough troops to capture and occupy Islamic-held areas of Somalia.

"I don't understand what Ethiopia's objective is," said David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and now a political science professor at George Washington University. "I can't imagine their objective is to occupy and hold Somalia. It was a very limited victory."

Most experts agree that Ethiopia's battle-tested army, numbering as many as 150,000 troops, could easily beat Somalia's ragtag Islamic fighters, which are believed to total under 10,000.

But Islamists say they would compensate for their lack of numbers and sophisticated weaponry by pursuing an unconventional war, including suicide attacks and other insurgency-style tactics that U.S. and allied troops face in Iraq.

"The Ethiopians could get bogged down into a hopeless, long-term guerrilla campaign with enormous supply lines," Shinn said. "I don't see how they 'defeat' the Islamists in the long run."

The attacks Sunday and Monday marked the first time Ethiopia has publicly acknowledged taking direct military action against Somalia's Islamists.

Ethiopian officials said they acted to preempt threats by Islamic forces to launch a "holy war" against them. Ethiopia is also moving to protect Somalia's weak transitional government, which has been battling with Islamists over who will control the Horn of Africa nation.

Somalia has been without a functioning government since 1991.

Anger over the Ethiopian airstrikes reverberated Monday throughout Mogadishu. Local radio stations flooded the airwaves with nationalist songs, recalling the history of tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, which last went to war in 1977.

Angry youths rioted in several Somali cities, urging all adult males to join the Islamic forces.

The Ethiopian attacks appeared to be bolstering support for the Islamists.

"I used to think that the Islamic courts were just another interest group, but now I recognize that they are standing up for the country and religion," said Muse Ali Omar, a banana vendor in Mogadishu.

"Ethiopia is my enemy, I will not sell bananas anymore," he said. "I will take my gun and go for jihad. Otherwise I am sure they will kill me in my banana kiosk if I wait for them here."

Mohammed Ibrahim Mohammed, a moderate Muslim, said, "As long as the West is supporting Ethiopian invasion, it will open the door for Islamic courts."

The Ethiopian strikes have helped unify the Islamic Courts Union, an alliance of religious leaders that came together to defeat U.S.-backed warlords this year. In recent months, some cracks were beginning to appear inside the alliance over how rigorously to implement Islamic law.

But more recently, U.S. and Ethiopian officials have concluded that extremists have seized control of the courts. They accuse court leaders of having links to terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda.

Last weekend, one Islamist leader issued an invitation to Muslims worldwide to join the fighting in Somalia. Eritrea is also believed to have dispatched as many as 2,000 troops to aid the Islamists.

U.S. officials Monday called on Somali groups to end their fighting, but they did not call for an Ethiopian withdrawal.

"Ethiopia has genuine security concerns," said one U.S. official, adding that State Department officials have urged the Ethiopian government to use "maximum restraint."

The U.S. has worked closely with Ethiopia, including training elements of its military, in its four-year effort to contain the spread of Islamic extremism in the Horn of Africa. U.S. officials repeatedly have denied using Ethiopia as a proxy against Somali Islamists, and have insisted that they argued against an Ethiopian invasion with officials in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital.

A U.S. military official said the Pentagon, which set up a 1,500-man task force in neighboring Djibouti in 2002 because of concerns Al Qaeda-linked groups were seeking refuge in the region, has yet to take any action in response to the Ethiopian offensive.

"We're just watching it," the official said.

Shinn said international leaders should immediately intervene and push to remove all foreign fighters from Somalia.

"A week ago I was still optimistic that we could get this cat back in the box," he said. "Now I'm not clear if that's an option."