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Tough Talk over a
Defunct Treaty: The Case of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement By: Yosef Yacob, JD, LLM, PhD
The
article by Odera quoted Egypt’s Minister for Water Resources and Natural
Resources, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, as having “… accused Kenya of breaching
international law by opting out of the treaty,” and … threatening that Kenya
could “… not lay claim to sovereignty to protect itself from any action that
Egypt may want to take’.”[iii]
According to the newspaper account, the Egyptian Minister “…hinted at
sanctions, saying Kenya would suffer if [Egypt] and the other nine decided to
punish it for quitting the treaty.”[iv]
The
Egyptian Minister then inquired “...how [would] Kenya benefit by withdrawing
from the treaty” followed by the typical Egyptian retort that
“…[Kenya’s] action [would] seriously hurt diplomatic co-operation.”[v]
According to the Egyptian Minister, if Kenya were to “…look at the
laws and regulations, [Kenya’s] action is not right," and stressed “…
this is a very serious action from one side” while underscoring “…our
legal people will be studying Egypt’s response."[vi]
The
comments by the Egyptian Minister of Water Resources are obviously calculated as
implicit warnings to other Nile riparians, particularly Ethiopia. The
Minister’s remarks therefore beg numerous and immediate questions. For
instance, which Nile Basin riparian, other than Egypt and possibly Sudan would
seek to sanction Kenya for exercising it sovereign right to meet the basic human
needs of the Kenyan People? Notwithstanding
the Kenyan Cabinet Member’s insinuation of the existence of a Treaty
“subject to review,” what is the legal status of the 1929 “treaty”,
rules, and regulations on which the esteemed Egyptian Minister of Water
Resources relies to accuse Kenya of breaching? This
article will begin by reviewing the position of the Egyptian legal scholars who
continue to brown beat legitimate attempts to raise the issue of Equitable Use.
The article will then review some of the applicable international law principles
and conclude by highlight the expressed position of riparians who were and
continue to be victims of past and present British and Western adventures in the
Nile Basin. Egypt’s Position The Egyptian legal position was first articulated in 1959 and was
explained as follows: Natural
and historical rights are nothing but vested rights resting upon a solid legal
basis furnished by the principles of prior appropriation as acknowledged in
international law and applied by the courts in international and
quasi-international disputes. Thus Egypt's right to her present water
requirements being fully protected by international law, whether or not they
were provided for by the 1929 agreement, and even if that agreement did not
exist. … It must be acknowledged that priority of appropriation gives
superiority of rights.[vii] Egypt maintains that the 1902 assurance made to Great Britain by Emperor
Menelik is still binding on Ethiopia. In 1981, at a conference in Dakar, an
Egyptian representative stated that: All
these treaties and agreements, … the Treaty of May 15, 1902, … the Agreement
of the Agreement of 1929, … provide for the respect of the existing quota of
the Nile water. They also ban the execution of any projects that may affect the
volume of the Nile water or its quality before negotiating with the country at
the Nile mouth.[viii] Historically, Egypt argued that, by virtue of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda,[ix]
Nile riparians were legally obliged to observe certain limitations in the
utilization of the waters of the Nile Basin.[x]
Therefore, Ethiopia was to refrain from any works in the Blue Nile Sub-basin
without prior Egyptian and Sudanese consent,[xi]
and Article 4(11) the 1929 treaty between
Egypt and Britain gave Egypt certain rights and guarantees. According to Egypt,
the 1929 agreement with Britain has devolved to the former British colonies in
East Africa, including Sudan,[xii]
and is subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,[xiii] which the International
Court of Justice considers the Convention as codifying pre-existing customary
international law.[xiv]
Therefore, Egypt argues that, the Convention allows termination and suspension
of the existing treaties only under the treaty provisions, by consent of the
parties,[xv]
or by a fundamental change of circumstances.[xvi]
In addition to the treaty rights, Egypt asserts “established rights,”
“historic rights,” “vested rights,” “priority of appropriations,”
“superiority of rights,” and “natural rights,” which give Egypt
precedence over other riparians in the utilization of the sub-basin waters. In February 1997, Prof. Saleh El-Din Amer, Head of
the Department of Public International Law of Cairo University in Egypt and
advisor to the Government of Egypt, introduced an additional proposition to the
position historically held by Egypt. After listing all of the colonial treaties,
protocols concerning the Nile and the 1902 agreement between Ethiopia and
Britain, he wrote: All
the above mentioned treaties and agreements are typical territorial treaties.
Under the rules of general international law, the state parties and their
successors are bound to accept the legal obligations of the treaties.[xvii] Prof. Saleh El-Din is the first Egyptian scholar to
characterize the Nile Basin agreements (including the two relevant to the Blue
Nile Sub-basin) as territorial treaties and therefore binding. Egypt
believes that an obligation is imposed because under general international law,
“territorial treaties” are not affected by succession. While it has not been
argued by Egypt, Ethiopia’s conduct since 1902 can also be construed as having
acquiesced to the validity of the treaty or its maintenance in force or
operation under Article 46 of the Convention.[xviii] This acquiescence is
conveyed by Ethiopia’s compliance with the treaty provisions in seeking
Egyptian and Sudanese consent during the Lake Tsana negotiations, and the
non-utilization of the waters in contravention of article 3. The succession,
validity and therefore applicability of the 1929 agreement and the 1902
agreement have and continue to dominate the heated dialogue involving the
utilization of the Blue Nile Sub-basin. Succession of Treaties Traditionally,
the method of dealing with treaties in relation to succession has been to
classify them as “personal” or “real.”[xix]
The postcolonial period completely challenged that position, resulting in the
law being uncertain.[xx]
State practice in the post-colonial period took several approaches: (1)
“universal succession” - the full assumption of colonial treaties by newly
independent states,[xxi]
(2) “Nyrere Doctrine” - the acceptance of all obligations for a short
period, to be followed by a declaration specifying those that were to be
accepted,[xxii]
and (3) “tabula rasa” or “clean slate” - adherence to rules of
international law, but the rejection of adherence to any specific treaty.[xxiii]
Because
of these extreme positions, the International law Commission completed the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties in 1978.[xxiv]
The Convention is based on the principle on non- devolution of colonial
obligations with the exception of treaties that delimit boundaries and
obligations said to “run with the land and other territorial regimes.” While
the Convention purports to codify customary international law, so far, only
eight States, including Egypt and Ethiopia, have ratified the Convention and it
appears unlikely that the Convention will enter into force.[xxv]
Therefore,
the question of succession of treaties is still governed by the rule of
international law which, based on post-1945 state practice, emphasizes
non-devolution of obligations, thus allowing new states, however they have
emerged, to wipe the slate clean.[xxvi]
However, the “clean slate” doctrine is subject to several exceptions.[xxvii]
The successor state would still be bound by (a) the rules of international law,
(b) dispositive or localized treaties (e.g. port rights, fishing rights,
demilitarized zones, navigation rights etc.), and (c) boundary treaties.[xxviii]
Dispositive treaties create
‘real’ rights and obligations ‘resembling’ the conveyance of the English
and American private law and the ‘acte
transitif de propriété’ of
some civil law countries.[xxix]
As such, dispositive treaties are immune to the change of sovereignty and
run with the land like the easements of English common law or the servitude of
Roman law. In other words, they are not personal to the contracting parties and
impress upon the territory a permanent status that remains unaffected by the
change of territorial sovereignty. Personal treaties, on the other hand, concern
political, administrative or economic relations; they are, therefore,
fundamentally contractual in character in that they are personal to the parties
and dependent on the continued existence of the parties.[xxx]
Therefore, ‘if any of the
parties to such a treaty disappears’ in relation to a part of its territory,
‘it ceases to be able to fulfill the obligations’[xxxi]
undertaken as a sovereign power over that territory. Such treaties impose
‘obligations of repeated acts’ and, therefore, ‘cannot remain in
existence except through the continued existence of the contracting parties’.[xxxii]
Even though writers such
as Brownlie question the exception,[xxxiii]
an overwhelming majority of writers accept
the existence of such a special category of dispositive treaties devolving
automatically on the successor states.[xxxiv]
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion
is that there is a category of instruments, variously referred to as treaties
creating ‘local rights and obligations’,[xxxv]
‘dispositive’ treaties,[xxxvi]
agreements embodying ‘obligations and creating rights in
rem’,[xxxvii]
or treaties establishing ‘obligations attached to territory’,[xxxviii]
and boundary treaties which devolve on the successor state. Egypt
therefore argues that the 1902 treaty between Egypt and Ethiopia and the 1929
treaty between Egypt and Britain are treaties establishing obligations attached
to territory, which have devolved automatically upon the succeeding states or,
in Ethiopia’s case, government. However, it should be noted that ancillary
provisions in a treaty, such as a provision on water use in a boundary treaty
inserted in a treaty negotiated within the general context of frontier
settlement, are in principle, severable from the latter.[xxxix] Sudan’s Postion Upon attaining independence,
Sudan refused to be automatically bound by treaties of the former colonial
administrators. The Sudan argued that, owing to fundamental change of
circumstances, the 1929 Agreement and related instruments and measures no longer
bound it. Therefore,
in January 1956, the Government of Sudan formally announced that it did not
consider itself bound by a treaty entered into on its behalf by the British
colonial administration.[xl] Despite
claims, which Egypt made to historic and natural rights and the binding nature
of the 1929 Agreement on riparian and particularly the Sudan, Egypt was
compelled to engage in negotiations with the Sudan in 1955, after the following
Sudanese declaration:[xli] It is
important to remember that the Sudan was not a party to the Nile Waters
agreement, which was concluded between the governments of Egypt and Great
Britain. The present Sudanese government considers that it was an unjust
agreement because it limited the development of irrigation in the Sudan, while
leaving Egypt free to develop her irrigation as fast as she pleased. As a
result, Egypt has increased her established rights in the waters of the Nile
from 40 milliards in 1920 to 48 milliards at the present time. The Sudan does
not dispute rights which have been established while her hands have been tied,
but she claims that the time has now come to change the Nile Waters Agreement.[xlii] Sudan’s position was
consistent with African postcolonial regional attitudes affecting treaty
relations. First, consultations were not held with the local people “whose
hands were tied” when a treaty relating to or to be applied to the colonized
territory was concluded by the colonial power nor was the consent of the
colonized people sought.[xliii]
Accordingly, many former African colonies rejected the validity of treaties
concluded by former colonial administrations without the participation of the
representatives of the native population.[xliv]
The African states believed strongly that the colonial action completely erased
and vitiated the element of consent rendering baseless any claim of succession
of treaty obligations after their independence.[xlv] Rebus
Sic Stantibus It was also argued, that the
1929 agreement was subject to the principle of conventio
omnis intelligutur rebus sic stantibus,[xlvi]
which would have the effect of vitiating the original treaty. Briefly, this
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus asserts that if circumstances which constituted
an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by a treaty undergo
such far-reaching changes as to transform radically the nature and scope of
obligations still to be performed, the agreement may be terminated.[xlvii]
A party may also invoke
a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for withdrawing from or
suspending the operation of the treaty.[xlviii]
Almost all of the contemporary jurists reluctantly admit the existence in
international law of this principle[xlix]
and the concept is also recognized in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.[l]
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v. Iceland)[li]
the International Court stated that Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
“... may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing
customary law on the subject of the termination of a treaty relationship on
account of change of circumstances.”[lii]
Article 62, in part provides: 1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has
occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence
of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically
to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
… 2. A fundamental change of
circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from
a treaty (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary.[liii] Therefore, rebus sic stantibus is applicable only if 'the existence of a given
factor or situation constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties
to the treaty' and if 'the effect of the change is to transform in an essential
respect the character of obligations undertaken in the treaty.[liv]
The question here is whether the changes introduced by the decolonization
process and the emergence of independent states in areas, which were formerly
territories under British administration, are of such fundamental importance as
to permit the operation of the doctrine. Following independence and in
reference to the 1929 agreement, the former British colonies in East Africa,
including Sudan, argued: a treaty
drawn up on the basis that 'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
regards the safeguarding of [Egyptian] interests as a fundamental principle of
British policy' loses its raison d'être when the position of a successor State
is being considered and that the independence of the territories under British
administration amounted to a vital change of circumstances with regard to the
presumptions under which the 1929 Agreement was made in that the Sudan (and the
East African States of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) can no longer be regarded as
territories whose claim to development could be taken up only once the interests
of Egypt, present and potential, have been assured.[lv]
Since
independence, the position of the Sudan has greatly changed, both about its
international status and to its economic and political development. Are these
changes of such fundamental importance as to affect the validity of the 1929
Agreement? While, the argument that the agreement had become an inequitable
burden on the Sudan[lvi]
may not have been sufficient, a treaty drawn up on the basis that “[H]is
Majesty's Government…regards the safeguarding of [Egyptian] rights as a
fundamental principle of British policy” loses its reason for being when the
position of a successor state is being considered. The 1929 agreement clearly
resulted in a subordination of Sudanese sovereign interests to those of Egypt
and Sudanese independence constituted a vital change of circumstances. An
independent and sovereign Sudan could not be regarded or treated as a
territory with a claim to development only after the interests of Egypt, present
and potential, have been assured.[lvii]
Furthermore,
the Sudan felt that “the 1929 settlement of the Nile waters was a political
matter and that cannot be used as a precedent.”[lviii]
Indeed, the fifth paragraph of the 1929 Agreement states that the agreement was
to be of a temporary nature conditional on future political developments:
[lix] The present agreement
can in no way be considered as affecting the control of the river which is
reserved for free discussion between the two Governments in the negotiations on
the question of the Sudan. The
Preamble of the 1959 Agreement also confirmed the temporary nature of the 1929
agreement:[lx] Whereas
the Nile Waters Agreement concluded in 1929 has only regulated a partial use
of the natural river and did not cover the future conditions of the fully controlled
river supply, the two riparians have agreed to the following ...” The position of the Sudan Government challenging the 1929 colonial
agreement expressed the shared attitudes of many former British colonies towards
colonial treaties. These treaties were casually negotiated to promote British
colonial interests without regard for the long-term interests of the colonized
people. Particularly illustrative was Sudan’s ability to negotiate terms in
the 1959 agreement, which was significantly more favorable than the agreement
negotiated by Britain on Sudan’s behalf in 1929. The
Position(s) of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya On
the eve of independence, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Julius Nyrere,
made a policy statement on the subject of Tanganyika’s treaty obligations. Mr.
Nyrere explained that he was making a somewhat lengthy statement because he
thought it right that and the world in general should be aware, in advance of
independence, of what the attitude of an independent Tanganyika would be to
certain treaties by which the territory was then bound.[lxi]
This policy of the Tanzanian Government was formally communicated to the
Secretary General of the United Nations in the form of a Declaration to be
circulated to all member nations. On July 2, 1962 the United Kingdom (the former
colonial administrator) deposited with, and requested circulation by, the United
Nations Secretariat a letter, which referred to the Tanganyika Declaration and
disclaimed responsibility for the observance of existing treaties in relation to
Tanganyika.[lxii] This
“Nyrere Doctrine on Succession of Treaties”, as it became known, was
followed with more or less minor variations, by Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia,
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Indeed became described as regional
international law on the succession of treaties in Eastern and Southern Africa.
Some former colonies such as Nigeria exercised their right as sovereign states
and repudiated some treaties conceived to be inconsistent with independence.
Many of these former colonies felt that colonial treaties violate the rule of
international law which prohibits colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations and colonial treaties by their nature are therefore void or
voidable.[lxiii] Tanganyika was giving all treaties concluded by
the United Kingdom and extended to its territory a two-year grace period
during which time they could be renegotiated, and that all agreements not so
renegotiated were to be considered terminated unless otherwise required by
international law. The qualification 'unless international law requires
otherwise' would tempt one to conclude that the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement,
being a dispositive treaty devolved on Tanzania by operation of general international
law. However, following
the declaration of the “Nyrere Doctrine”, Tanganyika, specifically announced that the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement no longer bound
it.[lxiv] The newly independent government took the view that an
inherited agreement that purported to bind Tanganyika for all time to secure the
prior consent of the Egyptian Government, before it undertook irrigation or
power works or other similar measures on Lake Victoria or in its catchment area,
appeared to be clearly incompatible with Tanganyika’s status as an independent
sovereign state.[lxv]
This announcement was conveyed through an official Note from the Government of
Tanganyika[lxvi] dated July 4, 1962,
addressed to the governments of Sudan, Egypt, and the United Kingdom.[lxvii]
Copies of the same note were delivered to the governments of Kenya and Uganda,
which were then under self-government status.[lxviii]
Accordingly, the government of Tanganyika clarified its position on the matter
in the following manner, without taking any further Diplomatic measures:[lxix] “The Government of
Tanganyika, conscious of the vital importance of Lake Victoria and its catchment
area to the future needs and interests of the people of Tanganyika, has given
the most serious consideration to the situation that arises from the emergence
of Tanganyika as an independent sovereign state in relation to the provisions of
the Nile Waters Agreement on the uses of the waters of the Nile entered into in
1929 by means of exchange of notes between the governments of Egypt and the
United Kingdom. "As
the result of such considerations, the Government of Tanganyika has come to the
conclusion that the provisions of the 1929 agreement purporting to apply to the
countries “under British administration”, are not binding on Tanganyika. At
the same time, however, and recognizing the importance of the waters that have
their source in Lake Victoria to the governments and peoples of all the Riparian
states the Government of Tanganyika is willing to enter into discussions with
other interested governments at appropriate times, with a view to formulating
and agreeing on measures for the regulation and division of the waters in a manner
that is just and equitable to all riparian states and of the greatest benefit to
all their peoples. "In the meantime, the
Government of Tanganyika for its part attached considerable importance to the
continuation of the present arrangements whereby technical experts from the
United Arab Republic, the Sudan, and the three East African countries of
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda meet at intervals to discuss common technical
problems connected with the uses of the waters of the Nile.”[lxx] On November 21st, 1963, Egypt, in a note
replying to Tanganyika, simply submitted that “pending further agreement, the
1929 Nile Waters Agreement “… which has so far regulated the use of the Nile
waters, remains valid and applicable.”[lxxi]
The Note added that Egypt was in favor of
continuing the unofficial talks between the technical experts from Egypt and the
Sudan, on the one hand, and Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, on the other. Copies
of the Note were sent to the Sudan and to the East African countries of Kenya
and Uganda.[lxxii] On their accession to
independence, the other upper-basin States, Kenya and Uganda adopted a position
similar to that of Tanganyika. Like Tanganyika, they refused to conclude
devolution agreements with Great Britain. Upon its independence in 1962, Uganda too quickly
adopted the position expressed in the Nyrere Doctrine.[lxxiii]
In a letter addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations on 12 February 1963, its Prime Minister
defined his country's position on the subject of treaties concluded by Britain
and extended to the Protectorate of Uganda.[lxxiv]
Part of this letter read as follows: "(2)
In respect of all treaties validly concluded by the United Kingdom on behalf of
the Uganda Protectorate, or validly applied or extended by the former to the
latter, before October 9, 1962 [the date of Uganda's indepen-dencea, the
Government of Uganda will continue on a basis of reciprocity to apply the terms
of such treaties from the time of its independence, that is to say, October 9,
1962, until December 31, 1963, unless such treaties are abrogated or modified by
agreement with the high contracting parties before December 31, 1963. At the
expiry of this period, or of any subsequent extension of the period which may
be notified in like manner, the Government of Uganda will regard such treaties,
unless they must by the application of the rules of customary international law
be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having terminated. "(4)
It is the earnest hope of the Government of Uganda that during the aforementioned
period the normal process of diplomatic relations will enable it to reach
satisfactory accord with the States concerned upon the possibility of the
continuance or modification of
such treaties ...[lxxv] A year later, in 1963, following its independence,
Kenya also adopted a position similar to the Nyrere Doctrine, submitting
however, that the Government of Kenya was willing to grant a two-year grace
period in which the treaties would apply on the basis of reciprocity, or
modified by mutual consent. Further, stating that those treaties which were not
so modified or negotiated within the two years and “which cannot be regarded
as surviving according to the rules of customary international law will be
regarded as having terminated.”[lxxvi]
Since Egypt did not reply, as far as the Kenyan Government is concerned the
treaty ceased to have any effect with respect to Kenya as from December 12,
1965.[lxxvii] Therefore,
like the Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya – all formally repudiated the 1929
Agreement after they became independent, even though unlike the Sudan, they were
only remotely referred to in the
Agreement.[lxxviii]
Save for the Owen Falls Agreement[lxxix]
none of these countries appear to be under any obligation regarding the use of
the waters flowing to the Lake Victoria and Nile Basins from their respective
territories. There are no other agreements on the utilization of the waters of
Lake Victoria directly involving all of the riparian states.[lxxx]
The
Position(s) of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi
When the Congo, now Zaire,
became independent in 1960, the question of the juridical status of treaties
entered into by the departing colonial power and applied to the Congo was
raised. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba declared that all the agreements
concluded by Belgium on behalf of his country would be taken over or renounced
after thorough prior consideration.[lxxxi] But the treaty under
consideration was neither expressly carried over nor expressly renounced. The
Congolese Constitution of 1967 provided in its Article 6 that: "Treaties or
international agreements concluded before 30 June I960 [the date of
independence] will remain valid only to the extent that they have not
been modified by national legislation'.[lxxxii]
There is no evidence of any such modification of the Anglo-Belgian
Agreement of May 9th 1906. by national legislation. It could
therefore be argued that the agreements continue to bind the Congo. The Anglo-Belgian Agreement
of November 22, 1934 concerned the water rights of Rwanda-Burundi and Tanganyika
on the Kagera River system.[lxxxiii]
Article I provided: "Water diverted
from a part of the watercourse situated wholly within either territory shall be
returned without substantial reduction to its natural bed at some point before
such watercourse flows into the other territory or at some point before such
watercourse forms the common boundary." The position of Tanzania on
the question of colonial treaties has already been considered. When Rwanda became independent, the following
general declaration was made: "The
Rwandese Republic undertakes to comply with the international treaties and
agreement concluded by Belgium and applicable to Rwanda which the Rwandese
Republic does not denounce or which have not given rise to any comments on its
part. The Government of the Republic will decide which of these international
treaties and agreements should in its opinion apply to independent Rwanda, and
in so doing will base itself on international practice.[lxxxiv]
Burundi, in a Note of June
1964, made a much more elaborate declaration which was cast somewhat along the
lines of that of Tanganyika.[lxxxv]
This Declaration reads: "...
The Government of the Kingdom of Burundi is prepared to succeed to bilateral
agreements subject to the following reservations: (1) the agreements in question
must remain in force for a period of four years, from 1 July 1962, the date of
independence of Burundi, that is to say until 1 July 1966; (2) the agreements in
question must be applied on a basis of reciprocity; (3) the agreements in
question must be renewable by agreement between the parties; (4) the agreements
in question must have been effectively applied; (5) the agreements in question
must be subject to the general conditions of the law of nations governing the
modification and termination of international instruments; (6) the agreements in
question must not be contrary to the letter or the spirit of the constitution
... of Burundi."[lxxxvi] When the period thus specified had expired, any agreement which had not
been renewed by the parties or had terminated under the rules of customary
international law was regarded by the Government of Burundi as having lapsed.[lxxxvii]
A Note of December 1966 had extended the period of grace specified in
paragraph 1 of the Declaration by a further period of two years,[lxxxviii] which means that the
1934 Agreement lapsed in December 1968. Arguably, Congo and Rwanda
are therefore subject to the provisions of the 1906 and the 1934 agreements,
respectively. The validity of the agreements do not appear to have been
challenged nor renounced pursuant to the policies adopted following their
independence. The 1929 treaty is therefore
defunct and has no legal significance in the Nile Basin. Therefore, rather than
the polemics, wishful thinking, constant threats, and legal posturing which has
thus far characterized the Egyptian attitude, the equitable utilization of the
sub-basin’s waters is to be based upon a careful consideration of principles
negotiated by the Nile Basin riparians. [i] Argwings Odera, “Egypt Talks Tough Over Nile Waters,” East African Standard, Addis Ababa, Friday, December 12, 1004 posted on the web on December 12, 2003 at: http://www.eastandard.net/headlines/news12120317.htm. [Accessed on 12/12/2003] [ii] “Kenya Wants Nile Water,” BBC News, UK Edition, 23 July, 2003, posted on the web on July 23, 2004 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3091085.stm. [Accessed on 7/23/2003] [iii] See supra note 1. [iv][iv] Ibid. [v] Ibid. [vi] Ibid. [vii]
J. M. Badr, “The Nile Waters Question: Background and Recent
Development” (1959) 5 Egyptian Society of International Law 96. [viii]
Government of Egypt, “A report submitted to the Inter-Regional Meeting of
International River Organizations” in Country
Report (Dakar, Senegal, 1981) [unpublished] at 17. [ix]
“Every Treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.” See Articles 26, 27, and 30 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties]. [x] See generally H. K. Batstone, “The Utilization of the Nile Waters” (1958) I.C.L.Q. 551; A. H. Garreston, “The Nile Basin” in A. H. Garreston, R. D. Hayton & C. J. Olmstead, eds., The Law of International Drainage Basins (New York: Oceana, 1967) at 291-292; S. M. Hosni, “The Nile Regime” (1961) 17 Revu égyptienne de droit international 89. This article is a comprehensive treatment of the rights and obligations relating to the Nile waters and of the legal principles applied and developed; Okidi, “Legal and Policy Regime of the Lake Victoria and the Nile Basin” (1980) Indian J. Int’l L. 395. [xi] Treaty between Ethiopia and Great Britain for the Delimitation of the Ethiopian-Sudan Frontier, 15 May 1902, T.S. 16. [xii] S. Ahmed, “Context and Precedents with Respect for the Development, Division and Management of Nile Waters” in P. P. Howell & J. Allan, eds., The Nile (London: University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, Center for Near Eastern and Middle East Studies, 1990) at 229. [xiii]
B. A. Godana, Africa's Shared Water
Resources: Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Nile, Niger and Senegal
River Systems (Boulder, Colo.: L. Reinner, 1985) at 143-144. [xiv] Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1973] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 20-21. [xv] Supra note 7. Section 3, Article 54 provides: “The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty, or (b) at any time by consent of all parties after consultation with the other contracting states” [Emphasis added]. [xvi] See Article 62, ibid. [xvii] S. E. Amer, “Cooperation in the Nile Basin: Appropriate Legal and Institutional Framework” in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation, (5th Nile 2002 Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24 February 24 1997) (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: ECA Printing Department, 1998) at 325. [xviii] Article 46, supra note 7. [xix] See J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (New York: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 28. [xx] It has never been seriously doubted that States ‘succeed’ to general international law, in particular international customary law. The controversy has always been related to the rights and obligations created by treaty. Therefore, the problem concerning the Nile treaties is the extent to which these treaties have survived the change of territorial sovereignty and devolved on the successor States (Godana, supra note 7 at 134, 143-144). [xxi] See M. Mutiti, State Succession in Respect to Newly Independent African States (Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1976) at 31. In Africa, Nigeria adopted this approach. [xxii] The “Nyrere Doctrine” adopted by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi. See S. T. Maliti & E. E. Seaton, Tanzania Treaty Practice (Nairobi, Kenya: Oxford University Press, 1973) at 19; and F. N. Okoye, International Law and the New African States (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1972) for Nyrere Doctrine and different approaches taken by African States. [xxiii]
Ibid. [xxiv]
Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect to Treaties (entered into force November 6, 1996)
1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488. [xxv]
The other states are Dominica, Iraq, Morocco, Seychelles, Tunisia and
Yugoslavia. [xxvi] See H. M. Kindred, et al., eds., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at 62. [xxvii] Ibid. [xxviii] Ibid. [xxix] A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 256. [xxx] D. P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956) at 15. [xxxi] Ibid. [xxxii] Ibid. at 49. [xxxiii] See also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 666. [xxxiv] For opposing views, see the authorities referred to in D. P. O’Connell, International Law, vol. 1 (London: Stevens, 1970) at 373, n. 26. See also D. P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law in International Relations, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) at 91, 155-157; A.B. Keith, The Theory of State Succession with Special Reference to England and Colonial Law (London: Waterloo and Sons, 1907) at 19-20, 99; W. E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924) at 114. [xxxv] H. Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, 5th ed., vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Greens and Co., 1937) at 149. [xxxvi] Supra note 28 at 49. [xxxvii]
Supra note 27 at 656. [xxxviii]
B. W.G. de Muralt, The problem of
State Succession (The Hague: Martinuss Nijhoff, 1954) at 40-57. [xxxix]
See Article 44 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 3, for the conditions of severability. [xl]
It is interesting to note Egypt had at one stage denounced the 1929
Agreement as a “wicked imperialist plot.” See P.P. Howell, “East
Africa’s Water requirements: The Equatorial Nile Project and the Nile
Waters Agreement of 1929: A Brief Historical Overview” in J. Allan &
P. P. Howell, eds., The Nile: Sharing
a Scarce Resource (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 96. [xli] See A. Sayed Badour, “Sudan Egyptian Relations” (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) at 221. [xlii] Sudan Ministry of Irrigation and Hydro-electric Power, The Nile Waters Question (Khartoum: Government of Sudan Survey Department Press, 1955) at 4; U. K., H. C., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 596, col. 342 (26 November 1958) (British Foreign Secretary). No official declaration denouncing or refusing to observe the agreement appears to have been made. [xliii]
See Maliti & Seaton, supra
note 16 at 19. Although implicit,
international law is silent on the question of whether consent, in the legal
sense, is fundamentally necessary for the validity of a treaty. For example
Article II of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides: “The consent of a state to be bound by a
treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a
treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or by other means if
so agreed.” Part V of the Convention
in Section 2, concern with the effect of fraud, corruption, coercion,
threats use of force in achieving an agreement would seem to require
voluntary and informed consent as a necessary ingredient for the validity of
a treaty (supra note 3). [xliv] See ibid. Principle of res inter alios acta – Latin phrase meaning “a thing done between others.” [xlv] See ibid. at 19. [xlvi] See Batstone, supra note 8 at 532. [xlvii] See ibid. [xlviii]
See ILC Draft, art. 44 (1963) Y.I.L.C. ii. 207; ILC Final Draft, art. 39
Commentary, para. 5 (1966) Y.I.L.C. ii. 237 (See also McNair, supra
note 23 at 681-691. See also A. Vamvoukos, Termination
of Treaties in International Law: The Doctrine of Stanibus Sic Rebus and
Desuetude (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984) at 192-196. [xlix]
Supra note 24 at 111. [l]
Supra note 7. [li]
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,
[1973] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 20-21. [lii]
Ibid. at 63, para. 36. [liii]
Article 62, supra note 3; see also
Brownlie, supra note 27 at 624. [liv]
Ibid. Thus in the Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex, the Permanent Court held that the
particular changes invoked by France, although very substantial, did not
affect “the whole body of circumstances – circumstances essentially
governed by the geographical configuration of the Canton of Geneva and of
the surrounding region which the High Contracting Parties had in mind at the
time that the freeze zones were created” (P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 46 at
158). [lv]
See Batstone, supra note 8 at 539. [lvi]
The Sudan objected that the small amount of water allocated by the 1929
agreement took no account of increasing needs for irrigation and
hydro-electricity development (“Sudan” The
Times (23 September 1958) at 2. [lvii]
See Batstone, supra note 8 at 539. [lviii]
F. J. Berber, Rivers in International
Law (New York: Oceana, 1959) at 96. [lix] Agreement Between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, signed at Cairo, Egypt, 8 November 1959 and Protocol Concerning the Establishment of the Permanent Joint Technical Commission, signed at Cairo, Egypt, 17 January 1960 (United Nations Legislative Series: Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for other Purposes than Navigation, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (New York, United Nations Press, 1963) [hereinafter Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers]); see also 453 U.N.T.S. 51. [lx] Ibid. [lxi] The rest of this
statement continued as follows, “The
Government of Tanganyika has given the most careful consideration to the
question of what to do about the treaties, which were applied by the United
Kingdom to the territory of Tanganyika during the periods of the Mandate and
trusteeship. The Government is naturally anxious that the emergence of
Tanganyika as an independent State should in general cause as little disruption
as possible to the relations, which previously existed between foreign
states and Tanganyika. At the same time the Government must be vigilant to
ensure that where international law does not require it Tanganyika shall not
in the future be bound by pre-independence commitments which are no longer
compatible with her new status and interest. The United Kingdom Government has made a suggestion for the conclusion of an inheritance agreement between Tanganyika and herself, similar to ones previously concluded by the United Kingdom and other countries coming to independence. After examining the proposal in detail, the government has felt unable to accept it. We understand that the effect of such an agreement might be to enable third States to call upon Tanganyika to perform certain treaty obligations from which Tanganyika would otherwise have been released by her emergence into independent statehood. Moreover, we were advised that an inheritance agreement would probably not be able by itself to enable us to insist that third states discharged towards us thc obligations which they assumed under the original treaty. We have, therefore, decided to follow a different path. We have made a formal declaration in this sense to the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization. In it, we say that we are willing on a basis of reciprocity to continue in force for a period of two years from Independence Day all valid bilateral treaties, which would otherwise have ended, when we became an independent state. During that two-year period we will negotiate with the States concerned with a view, where appropriate, to continuing or changing these treaties in a mutually acceptable manner. We are also willing and anxious that Tanganyika should play her role in the family of nations by participation not only in those multilateral treaties which the United Kingdom may have extended or applied to the territory of Tanganyika but also even in those not so applied. However, because of the wide range of subject matter covered by such treaties and also of the difficulties of applying the interim solution proposed for bilateral treaties we have considered that the simplest solution is to deal with each of these treaties by specific arrangements as soon as possible. We are, however, prepared on a basis of reciprocity to treat such instruments as being in force vis-à-vis other States who rely upon them in their relations with Tanganyika. Seaton and Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice supra note 3 at 46. See also Hansard: Thirty Sixth Session (Sixth Meeting), 1961, Column 10. [lxii] Seaton and Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice supra note 38 at 46-47. [lxiii] Ibid. at 44 and 47. See also Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Twentieth Session, ___________, p.125 (New York: UN Publications, 1968). See also International Law Association, The Effects of Independence on Treaties, p. 13, (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd.., 1965). [lxiv] Paragraph 4 (b) of the agreement which provides, “Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in the countries under British administration, which would, in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.” See the Exchange of Notes Between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government in Regard to the Use of the Waters of the River Nile for Irrigation Purposes, Cairo, May 7th, 1929, BTS No. 17 (1929); see also CMD. 3348; UN REFERENCE ______________________________. [lxv] Seaton and Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice supra note 22 at 90. [lxvi] Tanzania became independent in 1961 but continued to be known as Tanganyika until 1964. [lxvii] See Seaton and Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice supra note 22 at 90. See also Collins, Robert O., In Search of the Nile Waters, in The Nile: History, Cultures, Mythes, (Haggai Erlich & Israel Gershoni eds.) p. 275, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, (2000). [lxviii] Ibid. [lxix] Okidi, C. O., “Legal and Policy Regime of the Lake Victoria and the Nile Basin.” A Paper presented to the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, March 1980 p. 26-28. [lxx] Ibid; also see Seaton and Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice supra note 38 at 90. [lxxi] Seaton and Maliti, Tanzania Treaty Practice, supra note 22 at 90-91. The Government of Sudan did not reply to the Note. [lxxii] Ibid. at 54. [lxxiii] Ibid. Appendix V at 149-150. [lxxiv] Letter of February 12, 1963, Ref. XS 1142. Text in International Law Association. The Effect of Independence on Treaties supra note 63 at pp. 117-118. [lxxv] This letter was followed shortly by a declaration of the Ugandan Parliament on the country's position in relation to such treaty obligations. This declaration read: "(1) During the time of the British Protectorate, Uganda was not in a position to enter in its own right into treaty relationships with foreign sovereign States. During that period the British Government, when concluding treaties with foreign countries on matters, which might be of interest to Uganda, made a practice of consulting the Protectorate Government of Uganda. In many cases, as a result of such consultation, the British Government applied such treaties to Uganda, and this meant that the Government of Uganda was legally bound in treaty relationships with the foregoing country concerned. "(2) When Uganda became a sovereign independent State on October 9, 1962, it fell to the Government to decide what attitude should be adopted in regard to the treaties applied to the Uganda Protectorate prior to independence. This matter has been the subject of careful study and of consultation with other Governments. As a result the Government decided: (a) that as far as possible treaty relationships should be preserved and our obligations to other countries should be honoured; (b) that a firm and binding decision upon each individual treaty must await thorough examination of the terms of treaty; (c) that pending the outcome of this examination of these individual our international relationship, treaties, suitable internal arrangements should be made to preserve our internal relationship. Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1963, ibid., pp. 386-387. [lxxvi] Ibid. Appendix IV at 148-149. [lxxvii] Okidi, C., O., “History of the Nile and Victoria Basins Through Treaties” in Howell, P. P., Howell and J. A.. Allan (eds.) The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource. An Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economic and Legal Issues, p. 329, (University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). [lxxviii] Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East, p. 72, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997). [lxxix] Remaining in force is the Owen Falls Agreement signed between Egypt and Britain (on behalf of Uganda). The obligations seem to have fallen on Uganda by virtue of its continued use of hydroelectric power from the dam. So long as this agreement is in effect, it appears that Kenya and Tanzania retain the third party rights extended to them by the agreement in event of injuries resulting from the rising level of the lake. See Okidi, C. O., “Legal and Policy Regime of Lake Victoria and the Nile Basin,” 1980 Indian J. Int’l L. 395 (1980). [lxxx] See Robert Collins, “Historical View of the Development of Nile Waters” in P. P. Howell and J. Allan (eds.) The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource. An Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and of Economic and Legal Issues, p. 166, (University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). [lxxxi] Statement by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to the Congolese Senate on July 21 1961. Relevant extract in International Law Association, The Effect of Independence on Treaties supra note 12 at 203. [lxxxii] Vitanyi, Bela, The International Regime of River Navigation, p. 113, alphen aan den Rijn; Germantown, MD: Sijthoff and Noordhoff (1979). [lxxxiii] See text in Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for other Purposes than Navigation, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, P. ___, (New York: United Nations Publication, 1963). [lxxxiv] Quoted in the “Second report on Succession in Respect to Treaties”, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/214, and Add. 1 and 2, 1969, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1969, Vol. II, p. 65. [lxxxv] The Text of Burundi's Declaration may be found in ibid. [lxxxvi] Waldock, supra Second Report on Succession in Respect of Treaties note 27 at para. II. [lxxxvii] Text in Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1969, Vol. II, p. 65, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.1. [lxxxviii] Ibid. |