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ASCENT OF UNILATRERALISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLUE NILE SUB-BASIN Yosef Yacob, JD, LLM, PhD Optimal and sustainable use and development of
international rivers as well as protection and preservation are dependent on
cooperation, and cooperation is an essential basis for the attainment and
maintenance of an equitable allocation of the uses and benefits of international
watercourses. The advantages of cooperation between states sharing an
international river have been amply demonstrated by scholars and inescapably
illustrated in game theory. However, Egypt and Sudan, the lower sub-basin
riparians, who presently benefit exclusively from the sub-basin’s resources,
maintain a clear advantage by preserving the status quo and are not likely to
embrace cooperation. Moreover, the present
policies of the international financial institutions, which require the prior
consent of each sub-basin riparian before funding any projects proposed by
Ethiopia,[i]
enables the strategy adopted by the lower riparians and perpetuates the status
quo. To maintain the status quo,
Egypt as a Blue Nile Sub-basin riparian continues to veto international
financial support for Ethiopia’s sub-basin development efforts on various
grounds, but primarily on the basis that Ethiopia’s utilization of the Blue
Nile Sub-basin would cause harm to Egypt’s claim of “established rights.”
Without the benefit of international aid, financing and technical assistance,
none of the riparians has the economic means to independently undertake
significant development projects in the sub-basin. Until recently, private
financing for major schemes in developing countries was also constrained because
of potential lawsuits, financial risk, and political instability.[ii]
Consequently, despite the Ethiopian Government’s seven-decade attempt to
utilize the sub-basin for the country’s economic and agricultural expansion,
favorable results were not achieved and the status quo has heretofore triumphed.
One
factor, which has made the stalemate tolerable,[iii]
was the political instability and ready international food assistance to relieve
the economic and political pressures for increased utilization of the sub-basin
waters by the riparians. For example, food aid to Ethiopia made possible the
augmentation of the nation's agricultural requirements to the extent that, while
not retreating from its previously taken position, Ethiopia was not driven by
impelling circumstances of drought and famine
to exploit the sub-basin and its resources. However,
if Ethiopia secures the necessary financing to carry out its basin development
plans, or if there were continuing drought, famine, and an unsatisfactory level
of international food assistance to mitigate the effects of drought and famine,
Ethiopia may not then tolerate the present deadlock.[iv]
The predictable and inevitable result will be unilateral development. This
article illustrates recent episodes, which have revitalized the two upper Blue
Nile riparians’ determination to unilaterally develop the sub-basin within
their respective territories, the increasing trend towards unilateralism, and
the consequences and the effectiveness of Egypt’s existing strategy to
restrain unilateralism in the Blue Nile sub-basin. Enabling Environment Four
years ago, the Egyptian government publicized to its people that ninety four and
nine tenths percent of the total water furnished by the Nile Basin is “lost or
is unused” and the Nile riparians “thus have a vast opportunity to increase
their supply of water” and that “the current disputes over the Nile are
focused on less than five percent of the Nile Valley’s total water potential;
this fact should drive home the great vistas of development.”[v]
Such
statements fuel the public’s anger and suspicion against the upper riparian
“who covet an equitable share from Egypt’s inconsiderable apportionment of
five percent when there is plenty of unused or lost water to be had.” Along
such public pronouncements by the Egyptian Government, Egyptian experts warn
that the present allocation of Nile waters to Egypt barely meets Egypt’s needs
and “any significant reduction would jeopardize [Egypt’s] very existence.” Egyptian
experts further publicized that “Ethiopia and Sudan have ample rainfall and
vast alternatives water sources they can draw on to solve their water shortages,
food and agricultural problems and to boost their overall development without
having to impinge on Egypt’s water right.”[vi]
Egyptian experts have also publicized that any proposed projects in Ethiopia are
not only unnecessary but are primarily motivated by political considerations and
“conspiracies” to use the “water card” to exert pressure on Egypt
variously by the United States in the past and Israel at the present time.[vii]
Ethiopian development projects will “wreak havoc”, “spell an end to
Egyptian agriculture,” and “change the regime of the river and spell havoc
for all the structures currently built along the northern reaches of the
Nile.”[viii]
According
to Rushdi, the foremost Egyptian authority on the Nile, activities of the
Egyptian Government in reference to the Nile Basin Initiative are also
“shrouded in the tightest secrecy” and have aroused suspicion among the
Egyptian experts who must rely on “unofficial press reports” and reports
from Ethiopia and Sudan. He reports that the Egyptian Government has failed to
release information to the Egyptian people concerning, for example, the nature
of the projects proposed by the Nile riparians despite the significance of these
issues.[ix] On
the other hand, in Ethiopia, economic development and food security have been
increasingly linked to the development of the Blue Nile Sub-basin and have
influenced the strategies adopted by “the state.”[x]
In the last year, the Ethiopian government has widely publicized the need to use
the Blue Nile Sub-basin as a means to achieve food self-sufficiency and economic
development through irrigation and hydroelectric dams. The
government has emphasized the present under-utilization of the sub-basin and its
resources, the enormous potential presented[xi]
and the government’s determination to exploit the resources to deliver the
promised rapid economic and social advancement of the nation.[xii]
The government has routinely identified Egypt as the sub-basin riparian who
continues to frustrate Ethiopia’s effort to improve the conditions in the
country by developing the potential of the sub-basin in its sovereign territory.
Mounting
expectations of economic development and prosperity have fueled the national
hostility towards Egypt, in particular. Ethiopian scholars and intellectuals
have depicted Egypt as the traditional “enemy” of Ethiopia and the major
obstacle to legitimate aspirations of the Ethiopian people intensifying the
historical, cultural, ideological and political differences and suspicions[xiii]
thereby galvanizing calls for unilateral development of the sub-basin within its
territory. In
spite of the strength of scientific consensus, statements by government
officials, intellectuals and authorities have triggered false impressions,
raised suspicion and negative images and hostility rendering the level of trust
among the sub-basin riparians. The chosen course of action has undermined the
willingness to legitimately weigh the concerns of other co-basin riparians[xiv]
and emboldened the riparians to act freely in pursuit of their own national
self-interest. Towards Unilateralism Despite objections from the upper riparian, Egypt
unilaterally embarked on its “New Valley Project” whereby water will be
pumped annually from Lake Nasser and transported thousands of miles, outside the
natural drainage basin of the Nile, to provide drainage for reclamation
projects. Egypt has also proceeded unilaterally with the North Sinai
Agricultural Development Project - a project aimed to carry waters from the Nile
into the Northern Sinai, by traversing the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, in order
to open the way for new settlements. Ethiopia
believes that the Egyptian projects are wasteful attempts to secure even more
water and to create conditions in which Egypt becomes the sole beneficiary of
the Nile by committing all of the Nile discharge, thereby pre-empting
negotiations and the rights of other Nile riparians. Ethiopia also questions the
legality of Egypt’s diversion of the Nile waters from it natural basin, while
moving to impede Ethiopia's use of Blue Nile Sub-basin waters to meet its
agricultural and energy needs. However,
Egypt believes that it has the right to use its allotment of Nile waters under
its agreement with Sudan as it sees fit. Egypt’s unilateral actions have
brought about serious tension between Egypt and Ethiopia, particularly after the
Egyptian offer to Israel of Nile “water for peace.” In
the past, Ethiopia and Sudan did not pose an immediate threat to Egypt's water
supply. Sudan's international isolation, Ethiopia’s economic and political
instability and the Egyptian veto power over international financing of
development projects in the upper basin provided little hope of foreign
assistance in order to build expensive water projects. However, with new oil
wealth, Sudan’s constraints on unilateral action have been greatly reduced. Similarly,
Ethiopia, with relative political stability and recent privatization of its
power sector,[xv] now possesses the strength
to mobilize private investment to develop the Blue Nile River and other
tributaries in the sub-basin. According to Ethiopia, in the absence of an accord
for “equitable” utilization “the only alternative left [is] for each
country to follow the example of Egypt in unilaterally making use of the Nile as
it deems fit. … If our proposal for equitable sharing falls on deaf ears,
Ethiopia will be forced to join in the scramble to obtain her fair share.”[xvi]
Both
Sudan and Ethiopia are proceeding unilaterally and independently of Egypt with
sub-basin development projects. Sudan and Ethiopia have signed an agreement for
power sharing arrangements and are exploring flood control projects on the Blue
Nile and the Sobat River Sub-basins, particularly as a result of the recent
devastating floods in Ethiopia and Sudan (threatening the capital city of
Khartoum).[xvii]
Furthermore,
financial assistance from international financial institutions is no longer a
significant factor for Ethiopia and Sudan and the prior consent of Egypt is no
longer a constraint on unilateral actions. Egypt and international institutions
are losing the benefit of any influence, prior consultations and negotiations
with Ethiopia, for joint strategies, solutions and sustainable development of
the sub-basin that will improve payoffs for all riparians compared to
unilaterally determined action. According
to Briscoe, Senior Water Advisor to the World Bank, private financing will play
a major role in the future of the power sector as developing countries take the
‘path of least resistance’ by using their own resources for these
controversial investments while submitting projects (to the World Bank and other
international financial institutions) which are more politically palatable.[xviii]
Briscoe estimates that in the 1990’s World Bank financing for hydro-projects
has dropped by approximately twenty five percent.[xix]
It is further estimated that in the future, ninety percent of financing for
power projects will come from private financing.[xx] Ethiopia,
as upper riparian, is now less concerned with trying to change Egypt’s
behavior and is acting unilaterally to develop the sub-basin, lack of
international financial assistance notwithstanding, with thousands of smaller
micro-dam irrigation projects, financed with local labor, materials and
revenues.[xxi]
Ethiopia also plans to proceed with its major development projects to utilize
what it perceives to be its “equitable share” as reflected in its
development plans. Since
privatization of the power sector, the Ethiopian government has actively sought
and successfully attracted alternative sources of financing for the development
of the hydroelectric and irrigation potential of the sub-basin’s resources.
Ethiopia is presently completing one major dam (scheduled for completion in
2003) on the Gojeb River, in South Western Ethiopia, through private investment
and ten small dams in the catchment areas of the Blue Nile Sub-basin. Farmers
in Sudan and Ethiopia are also building increasing numbers of small earthen dams
on the tributaries of the Nile presently taking about 2-3 million m³/yr. out of
the river. Ethiopia recently announced a private venture with an Italian Company
to build yet three more hydropower projects in different parts of the country
with an investment totaling US $400 million.[xxii]
On May 22, 2002, the Ethiopian Government announced that Cal Tech International,
an American Company, was to participate in the construction of a dam for
production of 350 to 400 MW of hydroelectric power on the Chelga River in the
Blue Nile Region of Amhara.[xxiii]
According
to the government, the US $600 million dam would meet the power needs of the
region as well as surplus electricity for export to neighboring countries. As
this conclusion is being written, the China National Water Resources and
Hydropower Engineering Corp. (CWHEC) is completing one of the largests dam in
Africa on the Tekeze River, a major tributary of the Atbara River in the Blue
Nile Sub-basin in Ethiopia.[xxiv]
The proposed US $224 million dam, which will stand 185 meters high, will rival
the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River in China, one of the largest and most
controversial dams in the world, by 10 meters.[xxv]
These and similar private and bilateral investments have increased confidence
among Ethiopian policy makers who feel emboldened to develop their water
resources without the need and constraints of international financing. Sudan
has also announced the interest by a Chinese firm to build a dam at Qajbar and
two other dams on the main Nile at Merowe. It is also conceivable that Sudan’s
newly discovered “oil wealth” would enable it to unilaterally proceed
further with its basin development plans and joint projects with Ethiopia for
electricity and control of devastating floods in Sudan. The 1959 treaty between
Egypt and Sudan allows the Sudanese farmers to build small dams.[xxvi]
If
the trends increase significantly as is expected, it could amount to a serious
diminution of basin Nile water reaching Egypt. In view of the changing dynamics in the basin,
there have also been increasing demands from Sudan to revise the 1959 Agreement,
which disproportionately imposes a burden on the Sudan in the event water
sharing with upper Nile riparians becomes necessary.[xxvii]
Sudan’s several threats to unilaterally rescind the 1959 agreement have evoked
aggressive responses and threats from Egypt. The mutual suspicion between Sudan
and Egypt reduces the possibility of cooperation and joint development projects
such as the Jonglei Project. As Egypt's “water security” becomes
increasingly jeopardized by development projects in Sudan and Ethiopia, tensions
between the sub-basin countries are sure to increase. Although
unilateral actions by the upper riparians and the escalating tensions may
increase the risk of conflict with Egypt, the status quo is perceived as
“inequitable”. The perceived inequity and the Egyptian proclivity to act
unilaterally will breed domestic political discontent in Ethiopia and Sudan and
will propel an unmitigated determination to surmount Egypt’s de facto veto
power in the sub-basin. In
the last five years, unilateral development through private investment has
increasingly proved to be a viable and effective alternative to conventional
international financing for major hydroelectric and irrigation projects in the
sub-basin. In the long term, the freedom to act independently, without
constraints, may gain favor as the upper riparians’ best alternative to a
negotiated agreement with Egypt and thus another barrier to a permanent accord.
Therefore, it is in Egypt’s interest to act timely and to apply wisdom in the
conduct of its Nile policy. [i] The World Bank and donor nations make agreements between riparian states a condition for financing water schemes. For a discussion of World Bank policies regarding riparian agreements as a condition of financing hydroelectric and irrigation projects see Krishna, Raj, “International Watercourses: World Bank Experience and Policy” in J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat et.al. eds., in Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political and Commercial Implications (New York, NY: Tauris Publishers; Distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1995) at 29. The Islamic Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have refused to finance Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Project GAP Dam project because all three riparians (Turkey, Syria and Iraq) have not entered into a water sharing protocol. See Jonathan Cohen, “International Law and the Water Politics of the Euphrates” (1991) 24 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. and Pol. 502, 550. [ii] For example, the Iraqi Government] plans to take legal action against firms financing the GAP project for not having consulted the countries bordering the Euphrates basin. See “Iraq Warns Legal Action Over Dam” Arab Press Service (Jan 30, 1993) available in 1993 WL 2502235. See also Barham, “Euphrates Power Plant Generates New Tension” Fin. Times (Feb. 15, 1996) at 3. See also John Briscoe, “The Financing of Hydropower, Irrigation and Water Supply Infrastructure in Developing Countries” (1999) 15 (4) Water Resources Development at 466. [iii] Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1991) at 74. [iv] On July 15, 2002, the Ethiopian Government called upon the international community for a “huge” increase in food aid. The WFP estimates 5.9 million people are in need of food aid and shelter in Ethiopia alone because of drought and resulting widespread crop failure, loss of livestock and displacement. See “Drought Forces Up to 500,00 Ethiopians from Homes” The Philadelphia Inquirer (Reuters News, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 29, 2002). Also posted online at: <http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/local/3570321.htm> (accessed: 6/29/2002); “ETHIOPIA: WFP Warns of Food Shortage” IRIN News, July, 18, 2002 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) also posted online at: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportiD=28812 (accessed: 7/17/02). The figures were subsequently revised to approximately 8 million people and the Ethiopian Government reported that as of July 26, 2002, only fifty three percent of the requirement has been met by the international donor community. “DPPC Says Relief Effort Fruitful: Ethiopia Canada Sign Food Aid Agreement” Walta Information Center, Addis Ababa, July 26, 2002 online at: http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2002/Jul?26Jul02?jul26e1.htm (date accessed: 7/26/02). [v] See Abdel-Azim Hammad, “Water, Water Everywhere” Al-Ahram Weekly (10-16 February 2000) Issue No. 468 online: http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2000/468/op5.htm> (date accessed: 11/02/01). [vi] Said Rushdi,” Cold Water Wars” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, Issue No. 531 (26 April – 2 May 2001): <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2001/531/special.htm> (date accessed: 11/02/01). [vii] Ibid. and also Hammad supra note 5 at 3; and Gamal Essam Dim, “MP’s warn Against Water Wars” Al-Ahram Weekly Online (Issue No. 377(14-20 May, 1998) at: http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1998/377/eg10.htm> (date accessed: 11/02/01). [viii] See Rushdi, supra note 6. [ix] Ibid. [x] See for example recent articles in the Ethiopian press. “Workshop on the Equitable Use of Nile Waters opens In Addis Ababa” August 15, 2001” Ethiopian News Agency Oline reprinted on BBC Monitoring Service online: <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=0101815007701&query+Nile=river> (date accessed: 10/09/01); “Water Resources Strategy Presented for Final Assessment” Ethiopian Radio (Oct. 3, 2001) text of report reprinted on BBC Monitoring Service online: <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=01100300932> (date accessed: 10/09/01); “Irrigation in Amhara Said Minimal” October 12, 2001” Walta Government Information Center online: <http://waltainfo.com?EnNews?2001/Oct/12Octct01/Oct12e8.htm> (date accessed: 10/12/01). [xi] See for example a recent article “Only 5 percent of Nations Irrigable Land Utilized” Walta Government Information Center (October 25, 2001) also reprinted online: <http//www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2001/Oct/20Oct01?Oct20e2.htm> (date accessed: 10/20/01). [xii] See for example the recent article “ “New Power System Expansion Master Plan Under Review” Walta Government Information Center Online: <http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews?2001/Oct/12Oct01/Oct12e2.htm> (date accessed: 10/12/01). [xiii] For example see text of speech delivered in Toronto, Washington D.C., Seattle, Boston, and Los Angeles, by noted Ethiopian scholar, Prof. Teccola W. Hagos, “International Deceit to Destroy Ethiopia,” March 2002 available on line at: <http://www.tisjd.net/boston2.htm> (accessed: 6/6/2002); and manuscript of a book in progress by Prof. Teccola W. Hagos, “The Conspiracy to Destroy Ethiopia: The Role of Arab States,” Dismemberment of Ethiopia: The UN and Butros-Butros Ghali, (December 24, 2001) at Part II Section 3 available on line at: http://www.tisjd.net/dismemberment_of_Ethiopia.htm> (accessed: 3015-2002). See also commentary by Getachew Redda, “Call for Ethiopia to Join the Arab League? I beg Your Pardon?” available on line at: <http://www.tigrai.org/news/articles1/Reda-June.html> (accessed: 7/10/2002). [xiv] See And Gareth Porter and Jane Welsch Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). [xv] See the Investment Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia – Proclamation No. 37/1966. For explanation of Ethiopia’s policy in the power sector see “Investment and Trade” at <http://www.ethiopianembassy.org/trade_ig3.shtml> (accessed: 6/10/2002); see also http://www.ethioinvestment.org/petrol/nergy/potential.htm (accessed: 6/10/2002. [xvi] Statement by Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, “Egypt is Diverting the Nile through the Tushkan and Peace Canal Projects” Addis Tribune (January 30, 1998) online: <file://C:\aol30\download\SEYOUM.htm> (date accessed: 3/23/98). [xvii] See “Sudan: Floods Destroy Thousands of Homes, Schoo ls, Health Clinics in North” Sudan TV Omdurman (August 26, 2001) reprinted in BBC Monitoring online: <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article/html?id=010826000500&query=Nile=river> (date accessed: 10/09/01); “Two Washed Away From Floods from the Overflow of the Akobo River” Walta Government Information Center (August 30, 2001) online: <http://waltainfo.com/EnNews/2001/aug/30Aug01/aug30e8.htm> (date accessed: 10/09/01); “Rising Flood Waters Expected to Swamp the Sudanese Capital…” The independent, (August 15, 2001) reprinted at <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html/id=010815002783&query=Nile+river> (date accessed: 10/09/01). [xviii] John Briscoe, “The Financing of Hydropower, Irrigation and Water Supply Infrastructure in Developing Countries” (1999) 15 (4) Water Resources Development at 459, 463. [xix] Ibid. [xx] P. Barnevik, “Energy and Environment” (paper presented at the World Bank’s Energy Week, Washington D.C., March 13-14) [unpublished]. [xxi] See Dale Whittington, “The Implications of Micro-Dam Development in the Ethiopian Highlands and Egypt’s New Valley Project for Renegotiating the Nile Waters Agreement” in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Co-operation (Proceedings of the 5th Nile 2002 Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Water Resources: ECA Printing Dept, 1998) at 503, 504 - suggesting the construction of thousands of micro dams in the Blue Nile Basin. [xxii]
Mikias Worku, “EEP Co., Italian Company Close Power Pact” Fortune Magazine Vol. 1, No. 74 (Sept. 30 – Oct 7, 2001) online: <http://www.ethioguide.com/aa-ethioguide/ethioguide/eg-news.htm>
(date accessed: 10/11/01). [xxiii][xxiii] “American Company to Produce Power” The Reporter, May, 22, 2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; also posted online at: <http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/eng_newspaper/Htm/No290/r290new6.htm> (date accessed: 6/06/02). [xxiv] “China Wins Bid to Build Largest Dam in Africa” Xinhua News Agency (June 1, 2002) also available online at: <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/o20531/5/b5on.html> (date accessed: 6/6/2002). [xxv] Ibid. [xxvi] Amy Dockser Marcus, "Egypt Faces Problem It Has Long Dreaded: Less Control of the Nile" Wall Street Journal (August 22, 1997) at 1. [xxvii] For example, under the terms of the agreement, which requires each country to equally share any reduction in the total discharge at Aswan, a reallocation of 16 billion m³ of Nile waters to upper riparian will constitute a 50 percent reduction of Sudan’s present share of 18.5 billion m³ as compared to 15 percent of Egypt's share of 55.5 billion m³. |